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NOTES.
BENEFICIAL SOCIETIES-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY-EQUITIES

-The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut has ruled" that
the administrator of the wife of a member of a fraternal beneficial
order was not entitled to collect the benefit where the wife predeceased the member, and no new designation of beneficiary was made.
The charter and by-laws of the association provided that in all
controversies arising with regard to benefits and rights of members the laws of Massachusetts (the domicile of the society)
should control; by that law no beneficiary could take a vested interest in the benefit until the same was due and payable upon the death
of the member.
The provision of the Massachusetts statute is only declaratory
of what was already the established rule with regard to the interest of a designated beneficiary in certificate issued to a member of
Supreme Colony of United Order of Pilgrim Fathers v. Towne, 89 At.
Rep. 264 (Conn. 1914).
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the society. It is sharply contrasted with rule in cases of life insurance, where policies payable to a person other than the insured ordinarily create a vested right in the former to the policy and its
proceeds, in consequence the assured cannot in any way control or2
dispose of the policy except with the consent of the beneficiary.
In life insurance cases it is sometimes referred to as "an irrevocable
trust," or as "a valid settlement not to be disturbed except by consent of the beneficiary."
In order to create any vested legal interest in the benefit prior
to the death of the member it must be expressly provided in the
charter or by-laws of the association. Generally speaking the member may change his designation at will, provided he conforms to the
regulations of the association. 3 The voluntary payment of the member's assessments upon the certificate by the original beneficiary
therein named, in the absence of any agreement with the member
to do so will neither deprive the member of the right to change his
beneficiary, nor entitle the original beneficiary to the insurance fund
as against a subsequent beneficiary named in accordance with the
rules of the association.4 But where there is found to be an agreement between the original beneficiary and the member that such payments shall be made, the authorities are divided.5 The same difficulty is not shown in reaching the decision that the beneficiary has
acquired rights, which will be protected, at least in equity, as against
a later designated beneficiary in the cases where, in making the payments upon members' assessments, the original beneficiary has relied upon an express assurance that there will be no change. 6 In
Jory v. Supreme Council,7 the court said, "We know of nothing
in the law which deprives a person contemplating membership in a
mutual benefit association from so contracting with the proposed
v. Nat'l L. Ins. Co., x44 Mass. 38; ii N. E. Rep. 502 (1887);
Ricker v. Charter Oak L. I. Co.. 27 Minn. 193 (i88o) ; Weston v. Richardson,
47 L. T. (N. S.) 514 (1882); Ferndon v. Canfield, 2o4 N. Y. x43, io N. E.
Rep. 246 (1887) ; Commonwealth v. Equ. Ben. Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412 (189o).
'Masonic M. B. A. v. Tolles, 70 Conn. 537, 40 Atl. Rep. 448 (i889); Leaf
v. Leaf, 92 Ky. i66, i7 S. W. Rep. 354, 854 (i8gi); Grand Lodge v. McGrath, 133 Mich. 626, 96 N. W. Rep. 739 (i9o3) ; semble, Heasley v. Heasley,
19T Pa. 539 (1899).
'Jory v. Supr. Council A. L. H.. io5 Cal. 20, 38 Pac. Rep. 524 (2894);
Masonic M. B. A. v. Tolles, Leaf v. Leaf, Grand Lodge v. McGrath, Heasley
v. Heasley, supra, n.3.
'That the member has such right to change designation, Brett v. Warnick,
44 Ore. 512, 5 Pac. Rep. io6i (i9o4); Bernard v. Gr. Lodge A. 0. U. W.,
13 S. Dak. 132, 82 N. W. Rep. 404 (1900). Contra, Mas. Ben. Ass'n v. Bunch,
1o9 Mo. 56o, i9 S. W. Rep. 25 (1892); Fisher v. Fisher, 99 Tenn. 629, 42
2 Pingrey

S. W. Rep. 448 (897).
"King v.Supr. Council C. M. B. A., 216 Pa. 553, 65 AtI. Rep. iios (rgo7);
Grimbley v. Harrold, 225 Cal. 24, 57 Pac. Rep. 558 (i899) ; semble, Spengler
v. Spengler, 65 N. J. Eq. 176, 55 Atl. 285 (igo3).
' 105 Cal. 2o, 38 Pac. Rep. 524 (1894).
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beneficiary as that, when such certificate is issued equities in favor
of the beneficiary are born, of such merit that the insured member
has no power to defeat them. .

.

. As between the original and

subsequent beneficiaries the whole matter seems to be rather a question of equities (as opposed to vested interest in the first) and the
stronger and better equity must prevail."
That is, wherever sound equities are existing in the first beneficiary, the member should be declared estopped to change his designation; and such estoppel being in force against the insured, it is
equally in force and stands against the second volunteer beneficiary.
Some courts have designated, as vested, the right of the original beneficiary to take the benefit, where he had made the payments
under an agreement, sufficiently specific, between himself and the
member, even though the member had subsequently changed his designation." But it will be found that the use of the term "vested"
results rather from haste or convenience than from full consideration of the question. "Vested interest" and "superior equities" are
in many aspects analogous, and may be readily confused; but the
clearer view is that announced in the California decisionsY
J.C.A.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-LImiTATION

OF LIABILITY ON THE HIGH

SEAs-The Titanic disaster, bringing in its wake claims amounting
to millions of dollars, at once raises the question as to whether the
federal statute limiting the shipowner's liability is applicable. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York has decided
that it does not apply,' the case is now pending before the United
States Supreme Court, whose decision will be a leading one.
The statute 2 limits the liability of the owner of a vessel to his
interest in the vessel and the freight pending, and in its terms is
sweeping, referring to "the owner of any vessel," and not merely to
American vessels. The question of its application to foreign vessels
has been the subject of numerous decisions and in the case of collision between two ships is fairly well settled. The case of The Scotland3 was the first case on this point. Here the British steamer
Scotland came into collision with the American ship Kate Dyer, and
'Stronge v. Supr. Lodge K of P., 189 N. Y. 346, 82 N. E. Rep. 433
i9o7); Supr. Council v. Tracy, i69 11. 123, 48 N. E. Rep. 401 (1897);
Leaf v. Leaf, 92 Ky. 166, 17 S. W. Rep. 354 (i8gi); senible, Supr. Coun. C.
M. B. A. v. Murphy, 65 N. J. Eq. 6o, 55 At]. 497 (I9o3).
' In accord with the view of the California courts expressed in Jory v.
Supr. Council, see the rulings in the cases, supra, n. 6.
2

The Titanic, 2o9 Fed. Rep. 5O (i9r4).
U. S. Comp. St. 19Ol, pp. 2943-2945, §§4282-4289.

aio5 U. S. 24 (1881).
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the owners of The Scotland claimed exemption upder the American
act. Judge Bradley, in his opinion, said:
"But, if a collision occurs on the high seas, where the law of
no particular State has exclusive force, but all are equal, any forum
called upon to settle the rights of the parties would prima facie determine them by its own law as presumptively expressing the rules
of justice; but if the contesting vessels belonged to the same foreign nation, the court would assume that they were subject to the
laws of their nation carried under their common flag, and would
determine the controversy accordingly. If they belonged to different nations, having different laws, since it would be unjust, to
apply the laws of either, to the exclusion of the other, the law of the
forum-that is, the maritime law as received and practiced therein
-would properly furnish the rule of decision."
The United States Supreme Court accordingly held that as this
was the case of a collision between British and American vessels,
the American statute was applicable, being the law of the forum.
4
This case has been repeatedly followed both on its part and in
5
respect to the dictum as to two foreign ships of the same nation,
6
with the additional qualifications laid down in The Belgenland.
"That is the maritime law, as administered by both nations to
which the respective ships belong, be the same in both respect to any
matter of liability or obligation, such law, if shown to the court,
should be followed in that matter in respect to which they agree.
But where one vessel alone is wrecked there are no Supreme
Court decisions; and those in the District and Circuit Courts are
not very satisfactory. The John Bramall7 held that a British ship
stranded on the coast of the United States could take advantage of
the American statute because the loss occurred within the territorial
limits of the United States. While in Levison v. Oceanic Steam
Navigation Cornpany,8 a British steamer wrecked off the coast of
Nova Scotia was held entitled to exemption on the theory that the
statute was the adoption of a general maritime principle applicable
to the owners of foreign as well as American vessels. This
case, however, would be overruled by the later dictum in The
Scotland, which expressly states that an injury to a British ship
in British waters would be governed by British law. Nevertheless the same result was reached in The State of Virginiag

'The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355 (r884); The Great Western, r18 U. S.
52o (i885) ; La Bourgoyne, 2io U. S. 95 (T907) ; In re Leonard, 14 Fed. Rep.
53 (1882).
'The Eagle Point, r42 Fed. Rep. 73 (I9o6).
S114 U. S. 355 (1884).
7io Ben. 495, Fed. Cas. No. 7334 (1879).
a5 Fed. Cas. 422 (r876).
'6o Fed. Rep. ioi8 (1894).

iNOTES
where the court said that the case of a ship wrecked on the coast
of the country to which she belongs was the same as a collision between two ships of the same nation and then applied the American
law to an English ship wrecked in English waters, which is obviously
incorrect. There are also numerous cases where the limiting statute has been applied to foreign vessels simply because the fact that
it was a foreign ship was not raised ;1o but as the court will never
apply foreign laws unless they are called to their attention, they are
not authorities.
It is of course fundamental that a law can have no extraterritorial force; but it is also practically universally held that a vessel on the high seas is a detached floating portion of the country
whose flag she flies and is exclusively within the influence of its
laws so far as the internal economy of the vessel is concerned."
And on the theory that the law of the flag should govern in all
cases on the high seas, unless there is some good reason to the contrary, there seems to be a possible solution of the question. In the
case of two vessels of the same nationality, there is no element present which can introduce any other law than that of the flag except
the fact that the case may be tried in the court of another country.
Since this has not been held a sufficient reason for departing from
the law of the flag in the case of two ships, and as there are no
more reasons, in the case where one ship is injured by collision with
some floating object belonging to no country, and which carries no
law, or where a vessel founders on the high seas for no appreciable
cause, the result should be the same and the law of the flag should
apply. Where, however, two vessels of different countries, carrying different laws, come into collision, we have two laws equally
applicable from the start; and since one court cannot decide the
case under two different laws, the courts have compromised on the
law of the forum, on the theory of The Scotland that it would be
unjust to either party to apply the law of either to the exclusion of
the other. Of course this result is simply an arbitrary rule of conT.S.P.
venience.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-COMMERCE

CLAUSE-MUNICIPAL

Li-

municipal ordinance of the Board of Aldermen of the City of New York required,
inter alia, a local license to be obtained as a condition precedent to
conducting an express business within the municipality, and also
CENSE AND REGULATION OF EXPRESS COMPANIES-A

"The Strathdon, 89 Fed. Rep. 374

(1898).

"1The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170 (1871) ; Crapo v. Kelley, i6 Wall. 61o (1872);
Wilson v. McNamee, IO2 U. S. 572 (i88o); lit re Ah Sing, 13 Fed. Rep. 286
(1882); It re Moncan, 14 Fed. Rep. 44 (1882); The Lamington, 87 Fed. Rep.
752 (i898); McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546 (1879); Wheat. Int. Law
(Dana's Ed.), §io6; 3 Whart. Int. Law Dig. 228; Whart. Confl. Laws, §356;
i Kent Comm. 26.
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that a bond be given "for each and every vehicle licensed" to be
conditioned "for the safe and prompt delivery of all baggage, packages," etc., intrusted to the owner or driver of any such licensed
express. The Adams Express Company sought to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance, claiming that the ordinance constituted
an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce and denied
to it the equal protection of the laws. The court' granted the injunction restraining the enforcement of the ordinance in question
against the company, with respect to the conduct of its interstate
business, holding that was an improper police regulation, since it
lays a direct burden upon interstate commerce, and that parts of the
ordinance were also invalid as being "repugnant to the exclusive
control asserted by Congress in occupying the field of regulations
with regard to the obligations to be assumed by interstate express
carriers.-

The grant to Congress, by the Constitution of the power to regulate commerce "among the several States" also affects to some
extent the exercise by the States of the power of taxation. But the
States are not prohibited from taxing either the instrumentalities, or
the subjects, of interstate commerce, provided that such taxation
be imposed on those instrumentalities and subjects (i) as component
Barrett v. New York, 34 Sup. Court Rep. 203 (I914). The Adams Express Company is a joint stock association organized under the laws of the
State of New York and therefore can sue only in the name of certain of
its officers, hence this suit was brought sub nomine Barrett, as President of
the Adams Express Company, v. City of New York, et aL.
'Act of June 29, i9o6, 34 Stat. at Large 584, c. 3591; U. S. Comp. Stat.
Supp. 1911, p. 1288. This Act was interpreted as exclusive as regards stipulations for limitation of liability in bills of lading, in Adams Express Co.
v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 505 (1912): "Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that
Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all State
regulation with reference to it. Only the silence of Congress authorized the
exercise of the police power of the State upon the subject of such contracts.
But when Congress acted in such a way as to manifest a purpose to exercise
its conceded authority, the regulating power of the State ceased to exist."
The Act was again interpreted as exclusive, as regards the making and
filing of rate schedules, etc., in Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424 (I9II),
and in Southern Ry. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444, 447 (1911) : "There need
not be directly inhibitive congressional legislation, but congressional legislation which occupies the field of regulation and thereby excludes action by
the State."
See also Northern Pacific Ry. v. State of Washington, 222 U. S. 370
(1911); Mondon v. R. R., 223 U. S. (igii). But see Missouri Pacific Ry. v.
Larabee Mills, 211 U. S. 612, 623 (I9o8), as to the effect of the vesting in the
Interstate Commerce Commission by Congress of a large measure of control over interstate commerce. At page 623, Mr. Justice Brewer says: "In
other words, the mere grant by Congress to the commission of certain national
powers in respect to interstate commerce does not of itself and in the absence
of action by the commission interfere with the authority of the State to
make those regulations conducive to the welfare and convenience of its
citizens." "Until specific action by Congress or the commission the control of
the State over these incidental matters remains undisturbed."

NOTES

parts of the mass of property, in the States,8 or (2) by reason of the
citizenship of their owners as subjects of the sovereignty of the
State,4 and provided also, that that which is in form taxation, be not
in substance a regulation of, or a restraint upon interstate commerce,
or, as it is sometimes put, a direct burden on interstate commerce."
Hence we find that a State may require a foreign corporation which
is engaged in interstate commerce to pay for the privilege of exercising the franchises of a corporation within its borders,8 though,
not for the right of transporting interstate passengers.79 A State has
the right to impose a license tax,8 or a tax on receipts, upon a company engaged in local commerce, even though the company be also
engaged in interstate business, so long as the tax applies to the bu§iness of the company which is entirely0 local; but it cannot impose
such charges upon interstate business.'
It would appear that a so-called "license" or "privilege" tax,
when imposed upon an interstate carrier, as a condition of engaging
in business, is valid only where it is imposed for business done
wholly within the State."' If the tax, imposed as a condition, affects
the whole business, both intrastate and interstate, without discrimination, it is invalid. 12 A State may tax an interstate railway, car,
2 Namely, the inherent sovereign power of the State to raise revenue; in
other words the power of taxation as such.
'Namely, the power of the State to regulate the health, morals, safety and
general welfare of the public, sometimes called the "police power," "Salus
popul suprema lex."
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 201 (1824) ; The Passenger Cases, 48 U. S.
479 (1849); Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 28o (1878); W. F. Co.
v. East St. Louis, l07 U. S. 374 (1882); California v. C. P. R., 127 U. S.
1 (887) ; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 578 (i8go) ; Mass. v. W. U. T. Co.,
i4i U. S. 40 (18go); P. T. C. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1894); W. U.

T. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. I (1895); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, r65 U. S.
194 (I896); New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (i898); P. C. C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U. S. 32 (I898); K. & H. Bridge Co. v.
Illinois, 175 U. S. 626 (1899); U. R. T. Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149 (1899).
'Maine v. G. T. Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (i89i), by a divided court, five to four,
Bradley, Harlan, Lamar and Brown, JJ., dissenting. See also Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (i8go); Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436 (1893); New
York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658 (1898).
'Allen v. P. P. C. Co., 191 U. S. 171 (1903).
'P. T. Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692 (893); Osborne v. Florida, x64
U. S. 65o (i896); Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 42o (19o2) ; Allen v. P. P.
C. Co., 191 U. S. 171 (1903).

'Ratterman v. W. U. T. Co., 127 U. S. 411 (1887); W. U. T. Co. v.
Alabama, 132 U. S. 472 (1889); Pacific Ex. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339

(i8gi).

" Leloup v. Port of Mobile,

141 U. S. 47 (i89i).
" Supra, n. 8.

127

U. S. 640 (1888) ; Crutcher v. Kentucky,

'McCall v. Cal., 136 U. S. 1o4 (189o) ; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127
U. S. 64o (i888); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (i8 9I). See also

Allen v. P. P. C. Co., 191 U. S. 171 (I9O3), to the effect that a State may
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express, or telegraph company upon its property within the State,
by ascertaining the value of the whole property, both tangible and
intangible, of the corporation, which is used in its business and
then computing the value of the line within the State by its relative
length to the whole."3 But a State cannot tax a telegraph company
upon messages transmitted by it to points outside the State ;1 nor
require a railway company, being a link in a through line of interstate transportation, to pay a license fee for maintaining an office
for the sale of tickets;15 nor may it require an agent of an interstate transportation line to pay a license fee for soliciting passenger
traffic between points in other States ;1 nor require agents of foreign express companies to take out licenses, and satisfy the State
authorities that the company has an actual capital to the amount
fixed in the taxing statute.' 7
It has often been said that where State action imposes a "direct burden" upon interstate commerce, it is invalid. But the principle "' underlying this doctrine of "direct burden" is nothing more
nor less than that expressed by Mr. Justice Curtis in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens :'" "Whatever subjects of this power (the power
to regulate commerce) are in their nature national, or admit only of
one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States is supreme and plenary. It is "complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other
than are prescribed in the Constitution." "The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be apnot impose a tax which is in any way a burden upon interstate commerce; but
it may impose a privilege tax upon corporations engaged in interstate commerce for carrying on that part of their business within the taxing State
and which tax does not affect their interstate business or their right to
carry it on in that State.
" P. P. C. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (i8go); P. C. C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1893); C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154

U. S.439 (1893); A. R. T. Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1898); W. R. T. Co.
v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149 (1899); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194

(1896); Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 (1896); W. U.
T. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (1887); W. U. T. Co. v. Taggart,
163 U. S. I (1895); W. U. T. Co. v. Missouri, 19o U. S.412 (19o2). But
in estimating the value of the whole property the State may not include
property in another State which is not used by the company in its business:
Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 49o (19o3).

" W. U. T. Co. v. Texas, 1O5 U. S.46o (1882).
" N. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S.114 (1890).
"McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 1O4 (189o).
" Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.47 (i891).
23 12 Howard, 299, 319 (185).
" See opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230

U. S. 352 (I912), at page 400.
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plieti to all the extethial tohcerns of the hatiornj aid to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but riot to those which
are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the pdtpose of executing some of the general poWerfs of the government.
The completely ihternal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself."'20 This reservation to the States
manifestly is only of that authority which is chsistefit with and
not opposed to the graht to Congress. There is no roohi in our
scheme of government for the assertion of State power in hostility
to the aitthorized exercise o0 federal power. The authbtity of
Congress extenids to evei-y part of interstate ommerce, and to eveiy
instrumentality oi agency by which it is carried on; and the hit!
oitiol by Cohgiess of the subjects cohimittd to its regUlatibh is
not to be deified or thwaf'ted by the tothiihgling of interstate ahd
ihtrastate operations. This is not to Say that the hatioh may deal
With the interttal coftwEis of the State, as such, btit that the exectitioh by Congress of its constitutional powei's to regUiate ititerstate
commerce is hot lIhhited by the fact that intrastate transactions may
have becone so intei-woven therewith that the effective g6vefhtient
of the former incidentally cbntti's the latter; This CdhlusiOri necessarily i-estilts front2 the supremacy of the natiohal power within
its appointed spheke. 1
The gfant in the Constitution of its own foice, that isj withotit
action by Congressi established the essential immuhity of interstAte
commercial intercourse from the direct coritl of the States with
respect tO those subjects embraced within the giafit Which ate of
such a nature as to demand that if regblated at all; their regtilation
should be prescribed by a single atithoi-ity. It has behtoiepeatedly
declared that as to those sUbjects Which teqUire A general system Or
tinifortnity of regflation tle poweVr of Coflkb-ess is eikcftsive. In
other riattersi admitting of diversity of tteatmeht according to the
special requiremiits Of local condltihs, the States may act within
their ikespettive jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act; ahd,
when Congress does act, tlte exercise of its authority overrides all
conflicting State legislatioi .22
"Pet Mr. Chief Jtistice Marshall ih Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, i
(1824), at pages ±95, 196.
"1McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, 405, 426 (i8ft); The ianiei
ial,10 Wall. 557, 565 i870) ; Smith v. Alabama) 124 U. S. 465, 473 (I887) ;
B. & 04 R. R. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 6i2, 6M, 61g (i91i); Sou. Ry; v.
U. 8.. 222 U. S. 20, 26, 27 (igi±); Motldon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R
2j3 P. S. 1, 47) 54, 55 (IgI).
"Cooley Ar. Board of Wardets, t2 Howard, 299, 319 (I85i); Ex Paore
McNeil, i3 Wall. 236, 240 (1871); Welton v. Missotti, 9i U. 5.,275, 28o

(1875) ; Couinty of Mobile V. Kimball, io2 U. S. 69i, 697 (iSto); Gloilcester
Ferry Co. v. Penn, I14 U. S. 195, 204 (1884); Bowman v. Ry., 125 U. 8.
465, 48, 485 (1887); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Hefley, x58 U. S.
A 103, 104 (894) ; Northert Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 37o, 378
(i91i); Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 436 (1911).
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But until Congress acts, there necessarily remains to the State
a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to
their territorial jurisdiction, although interstate commerce may be
affected. It extends to those matters of a local nature as to which
it is impossible to derive from the constitutional grant an intention
that they should go uncontrolled pending federal intervention.
Thus there are certain subjects having the most obvious and
direct relation to interstate commerce, which nevertheless, with the
acquiescence of Congress, have been controlled by State legislation
from the founding of the government because of the necessity that
they should not remain unregulated and that their regulation should
be adapted to varying local exigencies. The absence of regulation
by Congress in such matters has not imported that there should be
no restriction but rather that the States should continue to supply the
needed rules until Congress should decide to supersede them.
Further, it is competent for a State to govern its internal commerce,
to provide local improvements, to create and regulate local facilities,
to adopt protective measures of a reasonable character in the interest of the health, safety, morals and welfare of its people, although
interstate commerce may incidentally or indirectly be involved.
Our system of government is a practical adjustment by which the
national authority as conferred by the Constitution is maintained in
its full scope without unnecessary loss of local efficiency. Where
the subject is peculiarly one of local concern and from its nature belongs to the class with which the State appropriately deals in making
reasonable provision for local needs, it cannot be regarded as left to
the unrestrained will of individuals because Congress has not acted,
although it may have such a relation to interstate commerce as to be
within the reach of the federal power. In such case Congress must
be the judge of the necessity of federal action. Its paramount
authority always enables it to intervene at its discretion for the complete and effective control of that which has been committed to
its care, and, for this purpose and to this extent, in response to a
conviction of national need, to displace local laws by substituting
laws of its own. The successful working of our constitutional system has thus been made possible.
Thus we have seen that a State statute which regulates merely
local matters, even though it affects interstate commerce, is valid, unless it conflicts with a'n act of Congress. In such matters while the
acts of Congress are paramount, yet, so long as Congress has not
acted the State may act. Such legislation is often termed regulation
which does not require a national and "uniform system of regulation. '' 23 But a State statute which attempts to regulate interstate
Thus, a State may legislate as to rivers, harbors, bridges. etc. Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 Howard, 299 (1851); Nillson v. Blackbird Creek
Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829); Gilman v. Phila., 3 Wall. 713 (1865); Pound
v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459 (1877); County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691
(i88o) ; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, lO7 U. S. 678 (1882). A State may enact
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commerce as such, is invalid because it is unconstitutional. The
power to regulate commerce among the States as such, is granted
to Congress by the Constitution and is exclusive. Such regulation is
often said to impose a "direct burden" on interstate commerce, or
that it is a subject which admits of but "one uniform system of regulation. '2 4 However when a State attempts to regulate interstate
commerce, in the exercise of its police power, it may do so if Congress expressly permits. This is the single instance in which the
"silence of Congress" becomes important.25 This latter distinction
arises from the fact that since the police power is nowhere taken
from the States by the Constitution, it follows that such power remains in them except where it is used in conflict with some power
which is exclusively in Congress. When it does so conflict, then
(and only then) is the doctrine of the "silence of Congress" applicable. In such case the positive expressed permission of Congress is
requisite. It might be asked, why this apparent exception in favor of
the "police power"; why should it not apply equally when a State
attempts to exercise its taxing power or some of the various other
powers reserved to the States? The answer to this criticism would
seem to be the fundamental doctrine of the common law, salus populisupreina lex; that the power over the health, safety and morals of
the people is the only reserved power of such supreme importance
quarantine laws even though interstate and foreign commerce are incidentally
affected, and the power to absolutely prohibit additionally obtaijs where
the thing prohibited is not a lawful article -of commerce. Campagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U. S. 38o (igoi); M. K. & T. Ry. v. Haber,
i69 U. S. 613 (1897); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. i (x899); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U. S.137 (1902). A State may regulate intrastate rates. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.352 (1912). But when Congress acts the State
statutes fall. As to this see the various rules and statutes of States regarding contracts limiting the liability of common carriers. It was perfectly
proper for the State courts to apply their own rules and statutes until they
conflicted with the Act of Congress on the subject. Act of June 29, x9o6, c.
359r, 34 Stat. 384; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S.491, 5oo (9,2).
See also the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 249,
and amendment of April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 292, c. 143, and Mondon v. N. Y.,
N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1 (igi).
2'Thus, a State may not require the payment of a license tax as a condition of engaging in interstate commerce. McCall v. California, 136 U. S.
104 (I89); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (I89I) ; nor may a State
prescribe the rates to be charged for transportation from one State to
another, or to subject the operations of carriers in the course of such transportation to requirements that are unreasonable or pass beyond the bounds
of suitable local protection. Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S.
204 (1893); L. & N. R. R. v. Enbank, 284 U. S.

27

(igoi); R. R. Commis-

sion of Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101 (1912); C. C. C. & St. L. Ry.
v. Illinois, 177 U. S.514 (I899); H. & T. C. R. R. v. Mayes, 210 U. S. 321
(29O7) ; McNeill v. Sou. Ry., 202 U. S.543 (i9o5) ; Mississippi R. R. Commission v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 203 U. S.335 (29o6); Herndon v. C. R. I. & P.
R. R., 218 U. S. 235 (9o9).

'The Wilson Bill, Act of Aug. 8, 2890, 26 Stat. 313, C.728. In re Rahrer,
140 U. S.545 (1890).
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and inherent sovereignty that does not immediately fall before the
constitutional grant to Congress in the commerce clause.
From this discussion and the cases reviewed, three rules, or
rather two rules and an exception, are submitted:
(I) Where the power of regulation relates to matters of local concern, the power is concurrent in the State and in Congress,
2
but the State act must not conflict with an act of Congress. 1
(2) Where the power relates to matters of national concern,
that is, where the matters are such as admit of but one uniform system of regulation, then the power is exclusively in Congress, and an
act of the State regulating such matters is invalid because it is in
conflict with the Constitutional grant to Congress of the power to _
regulate interstate commerce.2 7
(3) There is, however, this exception to the last statement:
the States may regulate matters of national concern by the permission of Congress, when such regulation is an exercise of the police
power of the State. In such case the power is not exclusively in
Congress but can only be exercised2 by the State after Congress has
expressly sanctioned such exercise. 8
The opinion of Mr. Justice Hughes in the Minnesota Rate
Cases 29 is suggested as a most excellent review of the whole subject.
C. McA. S.
MORTGAGES-FUTURE ADVANCES-ACTUAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE

NOTIcE-There has been much diversity of opinion among the courts
and legal writers as to the validity of mortgages to secure future advances. Formerly such mortgages were regarded with jealousy, but
now in the absence of any statutory regulation their validity is fully
recognized and established.' They have become a common form of
security; and their frequent use has grown out of the necessities of
trade, and their convenience in the transaction of business. This
question again arose in the recent case of American Savings Bank
v. Kemp,2 and was disposed of in accordance with the view indicated
above.
The record of a mortgage to secure future advances is notice to
all subsequent incumbrancers as to advances made before their in"Supra, n. 23.
'2 Supra, n. 24.
'Supra, n. 25.
"230

U.

S. 352 (1912).

'i Jones, Mortgages (5th Ed.), §364; Jones v. N. Y. Guarantee, etc.,
Co., ioi U. S. 622 (1879) ; Staeffer v. Rodman, r46 Ky. I (igrI); Diggs v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 112 Md. 5o (igo) ; Citizens' Saving Bank v. Kock,
17 Mich. 225 (2898); Huntington v. Kneeland, io2 App. Div. 284 (I905),
affirmed in 187 N. Y. 563 (907) ; Moffitt v. Rynd, 69 Pa. 38o (1871).
2 I32 Pac. 617 (Cal. 1913).
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cumbrances.3 And in the absence of notice of an inferior lien, the
holder of the security for future advances may continue to treat the
property as free from subsequent incumbrance, and therefore can.
safely make further loans to the debtor. His prior equity under the
mortgage is superior to the subsequent equity of one who holds a
later lien as to all advances made in ignorance of such subsequent
incumbrance,
whether made before or after it attaches to the prop4
erty.
As to the notice of the subsequent mortgage which it is requisite the first mortgagee should have in order to postpone his future
advances to such intervening security, the adjudications are not uniform. As a general rule, it has been considered that the registry of
the second mortgage will only be notice of its contents to future
purchasers and incumbrancers, and not to prior incumbrancers, thus
operating forward and not backward. Therefore the recording of
a mortgage is not notice to a prior mortgagee to secure future advances so as to affect in any way the lien of his advances subsequently made.5
In support of the above view it is said that since the general
scope of the recording laws is undoubtedly prospective and not retrospective, the first mortgagee takes all necessary precautions when
he examines the mortgagor's title down to the making of his mort'Weissman v. Volino, 84 Conn. 326 (1911); Huntington v. Kneeland,
supra, n. I; McCarty v. Chalfant, 14 W. Va. 531 (1878).
'Cooke v. Wilton, 29 Beav. ioo (Eng. i86o); In re O'Byrne's Estate, 15
L. R. Ir. 373 (Ireland, 1885); Lanahan v. Lawton, 5o N. J. Eq. 276 (1892),
affirmed in 5o N. J. Eq. 796 (1893) ; Alexandria Saving Inst. v. Thomas, 29
Gratt. 483 (Va. 1877). But several jurisdictions in the United States take
the view that the first mortgagee may continue to make such future advances
with safety, although he might make them with full notice of an intervening incumbrance. Hendon v. Morris, iio Ala. io6 (895); Gross & Company
v. Chittim, 18 Tex. Court Rep. 9o6 (19o7); Home Saving, etc., Association v. Burton, 20 Wash: 688 (1899); Wisconsin Planing Mill Co. v. Schuda,
72 Wis. 277 (1888); see Gerrity v. Wareham Saving Bank, 202 Mass. 214
(Igo9). If by the terms of the mortgage an obligation is imposed upon the
mortgagee to make the advances, the mortgage will remain security for all the
advances he is required to make, although other incumbrances may be put
upon the property before they are made, and he has knowledge of such incumbrances. Tompkins v. Little Rock, etc., R. Co., 15 Fed. Rep. 6 (1882); Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74 (1862); Alexandria Saving Inst. v. Thomas,
supra. In England, however, it is immaterial that the first mortgagee has
contracted to make the future advance, if he has so contracted the making
of a second mortgage on the same property by the mortgagor releases him
from his covenant, and he is not protected for advances made after notice
of subsequent incumbrance. West v. Williams, 68 L. J. Ch. 127 (Eng. 1899).
53 Pomeroy. Eq. Jurisp. (3rd Ed.), §1199; In re O'Byrne's Estate, supra,
n. 4; Ripley v. Harris, 3 Biss. i99 (U. S. 1872); Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal.
383 (1888); dictum in Brinkmeyer v. Browneller, 55 Ind. 487, 494 (1876);
Wilson v. Russell, 13 Md. 494 (1858); dictum in Finlayson v. Crooks, 47
Minn. 74 (i891); Reed v. Rochford, 62 N. J. Eq. 186 (igoi); Ackerman v.
Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 43 (1881); Union Nat'l Bank v. Molim, 7 N. D. 2o
(i897); McDaniels v. Colvin, 6 Vt. 300 (1844) ;'Hall v. Williamson Grocery
Co,, 69 W. Va. 671 (i911).

558

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

gage and finds that he then has a clear, legal and valid security upon
which he may rest until such information is brought home to him
in fact as ought properly to impose upon him the burden of a reexamination., This is highly reasonable if applied only to such past
transactions as are not likely to direct the attention of the party to
the registry, as where the future advances are contemplated to be
made from day to day, thus involving a continuous dealing. But
where the clause for securing such advances is inserted as a mere
safeguard, and with no present expectation of the parties that it will
be acted upon, and the parties do subsequently negotiate a further
distinct loan, then there seems no hardship in requiring the first
mortgagee to examine the registry before making such future loan.
Accordingly, in several States, the law is well settled that the first
mortgagee is bound before making his optional advances to take notice of a junior recorded mortgage-in other words, that the record
of the second mortgage is equavalent to actual notice to the first
mortgagee.'
In answer to the contention that it would be a hardship upon
the first mortgagee to require him to search record every time he
makes an advance, Judge Christiancy said, "I have not 'been able to
comprehend' this hardship. It is, at most, but the same inconvenience to which all other parties are compelled to submit when they
lend money on the security of real estate-the trouble of looking to
the value of the security. But, in truth, the inconvenience is very
slight. Under any rule of decision they would be compelled to look
to the record title when the mortgage is originally taken. At the
next advance they have only to look back to this period, and for any
future advances only back to the last; which would generally be
but the work of a few minutes, and much less inconvenience than
they have to submit to in their ordinary daily business in making
enquiries as to the responsibility, the signatures and identity of the
parties to commercial paper."
It was at one time thought by eminent writers that the latter
rule requiring only registration of second mortgage to put first mortgagee on notice would finally prevail in all the American States,
each advance when made only operating as a lien from that date and
of modern decinot from the date of the mortgage ;9 but the trend
0
W.G. S.
sions is undoubtedly in favor of the other view.'
° Cases cited, supra, n. 5.
'Collins v. Carlisle, 13 Ill. 254 (i85r) ; Ladue v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., r3
Mich. 380 (1865) ; Spader v. Lawler, 17 Ohio, 37, (1848) ; The Bank of Montgomery County's Appeal, 36 Pa. 170 (i86o).
'Ladue v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., supra, n. 7, at.p. 408.
'Remarks of Judge Redfield in a note to the case of Boswell v. Goodwin, 3 American Law Register (N. S.), 92; i Washburn, Real Property
(ist Ed.), p. 54-.
"2 Washburn, Real Property (6th Ed.), §io84; authorities cited, supra,
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TORTS-ACTS INJURIOUS TO THIRD PERSONS-MALICIOUS Mo-

TIVE-It has generally been thought essential to a recovery in tort
that the act complained of should, under the circumstances, be legally wrongful as regards the party complaining; that is, it must
prejudicially affect him in some legal right; merely that it will, however directly, do harm to his interests, has been thought not enough.'
An interesting decision involving this principle of law is found in
the recent case of Gott v. Berea College.2 In this case a ruling of
the college faculty providing that "eating houses and places of
amusement in Berea not controlled by the college must not be entered by the students on pain of immediate dismissal," was held to
be justifiable and the defendants held not liable in damages to the
plaintiff, a restaurant keeper, even though the latter's business was
ruined by the enforcement of the ruling. Undoubtedly the decision
was correct on the ground that the college was a privately endowed
institution and the college authorities had therefore a right to place
any reasonable restrictions upon the students. 3 Had it been a public
institution, supported by State appropriations, it is doubtful whether
its powers of student discipline and control would have been so
broad." It seems clear, however, that the authorities of any public
institution of learning may lay down and enforce any reasonable
rules regulating the conduct of the pupils, and will not be liable for
any inlurious consequences resulting therefrom.5
The interesting point of law in the Gott case, however, arises
from the allegation in the bill of malice on the part of the defendants. Will a malicious motive make an actor liable in damages for
an act apparently within his legal rights? Again, will the fact that
an act done is within the legal rights of the actor justify it, if it appear that the act is prompted solely. by malicious motives? Judge
Cooley has said: "Bad motive, by itself, is no tort. Malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that a wrong
which in its own essence is lawful. An act which does not amount
to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with bad
intent. Where one exercises a legal right only, the motive which
actuated him is immaterial. When in legal pleadings the defendant
is charged with having wrongfully and unlawfully done the act
complained of, the words are only words of vituperation, and
amount to nothing unless a cause of action is thereby alleged." So
far as it has been applied to the control and discipline of students in
public institutions of learning, this broad principle of law has been
sustained, and the malicious threatening, persuading and intimidat'Addison on Torts, 6th Ed. (z89I), American Notes, Baylies, Chap. I, §r.
2 161 S. W. Rep. 2o4 (Ky. 1913).
'People v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186 (1866).
'State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 496.
'Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. Rep. 495, 62 L. R. A. 16o (1902),
Cooley on Torts, Vol. II (3rd Ed.), p. 1505.
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ing of scholars by the school authorities from patronizink a place of
business near the school has been held not to be actionable.7 But-it
is submitted that the broad ground apparently laid down by Judge
Cooley cannot be taken under every set of circumstances. Even
Judge Cooley himself seems to have doubted the strength of the
proposition, for subsequent to its statement he also says: "The point
is not without interest, and it would seem that there must certainly
be some difference between the man who proposes to keep within
the limits of legal rights, and also to cause no annoyance, and the
man who proposes to cause what annoyance he may find possible
without exceeding those limits." s A review of the cases shows
that some of the courts have also had doubts on the point involved
and there is a clear tendency in the modern decisions to hold an
actor liable in damages, under certain circumstances, for injuries
arising from an act done solely from malicious motives, altho
the act is within the apparent legal rights of the actor.
To illustrate this tendency there is that class of cases-to which
our principal case belongs-in which the defendant, acting within
his apparent legal rights, has so restricted persons under his control
or influence in the freedom of their actions as to cause injury to
the plaintiff in his business, that being the result intended by the defendant. In each of these cases malicious motive has been alleged
and urged upon the court as a ground of liability. The cases naturally fall into two groups, the one group in which recovery has been
denied, and the other group in which the defendant has been held
liable for the injury resulting from his act.
Group I. In this group the courts have denied recovery upon
the ground that the defendant has acted within his legal rights. So
an employer who maliciously refused to employ or to retain in his
employ any one who rented the plaintiff's house was held free from
liability for the injury resulting. Where orders were maliciously
issued to the employees of the defendant railroad company that they
would be discharged if they continued to deal with the plaintiff, a
retailer in the vicinity, no liability was held to attach for the damage
resulting to the plaintiff. 10 Similarly, a defendant lumber company
was held to have the right to maliciously refuse to honor pay checks,
issued to its employees, and used as cash in the vicinity with the
company's acquiescence, if they came through the hands of the
plaintiff, a nearby retailer, who was competing with the "company
store."'" So also a lumber company was held justified in maliciously
"Guelther v. Altman, et al., 26 Ind. App. 587, 6o N. E. Rep. 355, 84 Am.
St. Rep. 313 (i9O1).
, Cooley on Torts, Vol. II (3rd Ed.), p. 1511.
'Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me.

225,

46 Am. Rep. 373 (1883).

" Payne v. R. Co., 13 Lea, 507, 49 Am. Rep. 666 (Tenn. 1884).

" Robinson v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, 40 S. W. Rep. 843 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1897).
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posting a notice that it would discharge 12all employees dealing with
the plaintiff, a nearby competing retailer.
Analogous to the above are cases where school authorities have
maliciously enforced rules regulating the conduct of their pupils
to the injury of the business of nearby store keepers.' 3
Group II. But there is another line of cases in which malicious
motive has been held sufficient to entitle the injured party to recover
for the injury he has suffered in his business as a result of the defendant's apparent legal act. Recovery has been allowed in cases
arising under situations analogous to those in some of the cases in
Group I. A railroad company was held liable for the injury resulting from orders maliciously issued to the effect that any of the
company's employees "eating and drinking at the hotel of the plaintiff would be discharged." 4 The manager of a railroad company
was held to be personally liable for the damage he caused by maliciously using his position and authority to coerce the employees of
the company from dealing with the plaintiff.' 5 An adjacent retailer
was permitted to recover for the injury resulting to his business
when a lumber company maliciously ordered its employees to refrain
from dealing with him under threat of discharge. 16
Again, recovery has been allowed where persons have maliciously agreed to not only themselves refrain from dealing with the
plaintiff, but to induce others to do the
7 same, the sole purpose being
to injure the plaintiff in his business.'
-Where malice is indulged in under the guise of competition, the
tendency of the recent decisions is to look to the moving cause and
permit the injured party to recover for the damage he has sustained.
So where a banker started a barber shop for the sole purpose of
driving the plaintiff out of business and closed the new shop as
soon as he had accomplished his object, he was held liable for the
injury caused to the plaintiff.'3 And where a wholesale oil company
entered the retail field for the sole purpose of injuring a retailer
who had refused to continue to deal with them, they were held liable
in damages to the retailer for ruining his business.'5
,"

Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Ltimber Company,

(igoa).

121

La. 658, 46 So. Rep. 685

" Guelther v. Altman, et al., 26 Ind. App. 587, 6o N. E. Rep. 355, 84 Am.
St. Rep. 313 (9o1).
14 International, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 76, 21 S. W.
Rep. 559 (1893).
5Graham v. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214, s. c. on appeal, Ibid. 1656 (1895).
"6Wesley v. Lumber Co., 97 Miss. 814, 53 So. Rep. 346 (igro).
" Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140, 42 L. R. A. go, 81 N. W. Rep.
737 (1goo); Delz v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 400, 16 S. W. Rep. iii (189x).
"'Tuttle v. Buck, l07 Minn. 145, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 1i1 N. W. Rep.
946 (igog).
" Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 132 N. W. Rep. 371, 36 L R. A. (N. S.)
263 (Ia. 1gr2).
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It appears from the cases cited that Judge Cooley's broad proposition that "malicious motives cannot make that a wrong which in
its own essence is lawful" must at least be qualified in cases involving injury to business. In all of the cases cited in Group II the malicious motive of the defendant has been the basis of recovery. On
the other hand, in the cases of Group I, the presence of malicious
motive has been held insufficient to entitle the one injured by the
defendant's act to recovery. In the cases of each group the act
complained of has been in its own essence lawful.
But because of the different result reached in the cases of each
group it need not necessarily be concluded that they are irreconcilable on principle. An examination of the cases in Group I will
show that in each-with the exception of Payne v. Railroad Company 2 0-- the act complained of might be justified on the ground that
the defendant was acting to protect his own interests or those of
his employees, or on the ground of legitimate competition, or on the
ground of discipline. But in each case of Group II the sole moving
cause of the defendant's act was his malicious motive to work injury
to the plaintiff. The reconciling principle of these apparently conflicting groups of cases would then appear to be as follows: The
doer of an act in its own essence lawful will not be liable for injury
resulting therefrom because of a concurrent malicious motive, if he
can justify the act on the ground of protecting his own or his employees' interests, competition, discipline, etc. But if malice is the
sole moving cause of the act complained of, the actor will be liable
for the injury resulting therefrom if his object in so acting will not
result in benefit either to himself or to the community. In other
words, if the actor cannot justify his act on the ground of benefit to
the community at large, or on the ground of reasonable use of his
social rights resulting in his personal advantage, his malicious motive will destroy all justification for an act apparently legal and he
R. M. G.
should be held liable for injuries arising therefrom.

LEGAL ETHICs-The following questions were recently answered by the New York County Lawyers' Association's Committee
on Professional Ethics:

QUESTION:

A Receiver and his counsel agree to divide their fees, i. e., the Receiver
to pay to his counsel one-half of the commissions which the court might allow
to him, and the counsel to pay to the Receiver one-half of the amount which
the court awarded to him as counsel for the Receiver.
' Supra, n. IO. The decision in this case is very doubtful, two of the
five judges dissenting. On the principle advanced, it is submitted that the
decision should have been the other way since the sole motive of the defendant was to maliciously injure the plaintiff. At all events, the effect of the
case is nullified by statute. Shannon's Code, Supp. 285.

kOTES

i6J

Query: i. Was this agreement void as against public policy?
2. If not void, was it proper according to proper ethics?
ANSWER:
In the opinion of the Committee, the agreement is contrary to the proper
rules of professional conduct, and it is probably illegal.
QUESTION:

First: When a judge of a court of review or of last resort has a dispute
which he wishes to litigate, may he, without impropriety or a breach of the
ethics of the profession, prosecute his suit in a court from which an appeal
or writ of error lies to the court of which he is a member? Or should he,
before bringing suit, resign from his office as judge?
Second: When the judgment in such case comes before the court of
review or of last resort, of which the plaintiff is a member, is it sufficient to
meet the requirements of the ethics of the profession, or for the due, proper,
and impartial administration of the law, for the reviewing court in deciding
the case merely to say that the plaintiff in the case did not sit? Or, if not,
what is the proper action?
ANSWER:
First: In the opinion of the Committee, the Judge may properly prosecute
his suit without resigning his office.
Second: The reviewing court could, it seems to the Committee, be fully
expected to deal properly with the case. The plaintiff should, of course, not
sit as a judge in his own cause, but this does not disqualify his colleagues,
who should not (and doubtless would not) permit him to participate in their
deliberations or influence them in any way whatever. It does not seem to
us that any formal action or comment of any sort by the Court upon the
Judge's disqualification is necessary. A proper precaution to avoid possible,
but not probable, misunderstanding would be an informal announcement that
the disqualified judge did not participate in the deliberations or action of
the Court.
In the opinion of the Committee, the judge should not personally try
or argue his own cause.
QUESTION:

There are some collection agencies in town which are incorporated and
which solicit bills for collection. It is their custom to turn over some of them
to lawyers for suit. In such cases the collection agency always wishes to
deal with a lawyer as if it were his client and wishes collections remitted to it
instead of directly to the creditor. In your opinion, is not that method of
doing business improper? This question arises frequently and is quite troublesome because, so far as I know, there has been no adjudication of the matter.
ANSWER:
In the opinion of the Committee, the patron of the collection agency is
the client, but the Committee sees no impropriety in the lawyer's complying
with the wish of the collection agency in remitting to it; assuming (as the
Committee does) that the agency is the authorized agent of its patron to deal
in his behalf with the lawyer.
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QUESTION:

I have in my employ a clerk of mature years, who wishes' to have cards
printed showing that he is connected with my office. He has submitted to me
a draft of such a card in the following form:
A ........ "B........
with C..: .........D.........
Counsellor at Law
(address)
(telephone)
In the opinion of the Committee would such a card convey the impression that I am holding out this clerk as a lawyer, or is it, in the opinion of
the Committee, objectionable for any other reason?
ANSWER:

The Committee is not advised of any valid reason why the clerk, not
being admitted to the Bar, should use a card referring to the attorney; and
it appears to be beneath the essential dignity of the professional position of
the attorney to permit its use, while likelihood of its abuse seems obvious.
QUESTION:

At a social entertainment given by citizens who are members of a single
race, to honor a distinguished man of their number, a program was published
and circulated containing paid advertisements, of which one is the following:
Telephone .......... Residence Phone ..........
LARGE ACCIDENT, MATRIMONIAL & CRIMINAL
ACTIONS A SPECIALTY
ALL MATTERS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
................ (name)
LAWYER
............ (address) ....................
A ................ (stating advertiser's race) lawyer who is
a ............ (stating race of distinguished guest) man's friend.
Indorsed by leaders of the community. Has estimable record in
all Courts.
Is it the opinion of the Committee that this is proper professional advertising?
ANSWER:
In the opinion of the Committee the advertisement set forth in the question is improper. (See Canon 27 of the American Bar Association.)

